Processes are rarely perfect. They have their champions.
They have their critics. Very rarely do mechanisms and structures created to
address reconciliation achieve everything and anything they want to achieve.
Those who commend one mechanism over another, then, are either myopic or silent
to this truth. This is the case whatever the context and the aims
of such structures are.
The Sri Lankan government had a mandate on reconciliation two years ago. The
Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), some of its critics pointed out,
went beyond that mandate. Reconciliation was however not an end-all but a means
to that end, and no amount of pilfering with it could hide one salient fact:
that if we did not want outside agency to demand for accountability, we had to
deliver and deliver fast. Didn’t happen.
Mangala Samaraweera knows his words. He is not a yes-man as
his predecessor was and for this reason he is capable to achieving what the
LLRC could have achieved but didn’t. Read his speech at Geneva, for instance,
and you will realise that for all his flowery commendation of the current
government’s stance on inter-ethnic amity he subtly hints at what the previous
administration used to rant and rave about: that domestic mechanisms to address
grievances from a 30 year-old war cannot and will not survive with outside
intrusion.
Words however are easy. Action is not. So when Prince Zeid
Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein (who seems to have a gripe with Sri Lanka just as his
predecessor Navinathan Pillay did) demands for a hybrid court, structured on
the Nuremberg trials and hence focused on retributive justice, the reply from
the government was less than satisfying. Gone was Samaraweera’s subtle chiding
of international community; the letter was more concerned with commending the
Prince’s remarks and reassuring him to “wait, wait, and wait for more.”
First of all, if the government wants to achieve
reconciliation through a National Plan and mechanism, the Nuremberg trials
(achieved through hybrid courts) is the last benchmark it must base itself on.
Mahinda Rajapaksa made it eminently clear through his moves (particularly in
bringing Cyril Ramaphosa here, though his critics unduly lambasted him for
this) that he too was interested in a domestic mechanism based on a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (in South Africa), which would go beyond the
rhetoric-frilled LLRC and yet stay away from “war crimes.”
Secondly, as pointed out earlier, these processes are not
perfect. The rift between retributive and restorative justice, reflected in the
gap between Nuremberg and South Africa, is not so great when factoring in what
failed in both instances. Studies have ascertained that in South Africa’s case,
a subtle attempt at achieving racial equality by bringing in all communities
together echoed, inter alia, affirmative action. It did not stop at the
traditionally vilified community, the Blacks, and for this reason it went on to
achieve success.
That’s just one part of the story though. Among the TRC’s
failures was its gross mishandling of outcome, that is the granting of amnesty
to many key figures considered to have committed and sanctioned acts of hatred
against the Black community. Steve Biko’s family went as far as to call it a
“vehicle of political expedience”, which lends credence to the view that
inasmuch as Commissions are good and needed, they cannot and will not establish
reconciliation magically. Perhaps the misconception held by some of its
champions that it was an end rather than a means contributed to its failures.
We may never know.
The point is that we have been playing around with our
version(s) of what TRCs should really represent. Let’s not forget, after all,
that inasmuch as the likes of Navi Pillay and Darusman were genuflecting before pro-Eelam mythmakers (silently of course), the government of the day refused to
listen to them and challenge their myths, thus leading to a no-win, Cold
War-like situation where irrational nationalism rather than rational
internationalism was privileged. Nationalism is fine, but without confronting
issues that affect the country internationally it remains, as Samuel Johnson would
have written, “the last refuge of the procrastinator.”
So what’s the road ahead? It is clear (starkly so) that no
TRC is going to make everyone and anyone happy. Self-styled intellectuals who
trash Sinhala Buddhism will have to be included in it as well, but don’t expect
fairness to come from their side. As regrettable will be the tendency of
anti-devolutionists and anti-13A howlers to inject rhetoric rather than reason
to their submissions. Neither side gets off the hook here.
Now golden rules cannot be applied to suit every context. In the
case of our to-be TRC, what needs to be pointed out is this. Firstly, getting
rid of the “victor’s justice syndrome” which visits and revisits Commissions
like this CANNOT duplicate privileging the “other side”. Equality has as much
to do with affirmative action as the UNP’s brand of capitalism has with that of
the Republican Party in the US. The one does not mean, or lead to, the other.
This will not make some people, particularly those Buddha-bashing “moderates”,
happy. Can’t help.
Secondly, the process should be open and transparent enough
to convince people like Hussein to lower his demands. There was a time when he
and his ilk wanted an international probe. If with US support (for us), he
still wants a hybrid court, then achieving his targets with a domestic approach
(that is, justice without amnesty, albeit this should NOT license the finding
of “war crimes”), then (who knows?) he may lower his demands even more,
crushing the fantasies of the pro-LTTE Diaspora and shutting them up for good.
Processes need miracles to be perfect. They don’t make
everyone happy but then again they don’t have to. Perfection on this count will
be judged on how far the local mechanism to handle reconciliation achieves its
outcome(s). If this is what matters, then both local and foreign players may
find that miracles are not long in coming. At all.
Written for: The Nation, September 19 2015
Written for: The Nation, September 19 2015
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